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Abstract 
The increasing polarization of modern politics combined with the increasing cost burden housing 
provides for many families has placed the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) under 
scrutiny. Once known for being an effective compromise across the aisle, LIHTC used tax 
credits to create a market for affordable housing developments across the country. This program 
has created a majority of the affordable housing units in the country, but the involvement of 
private profit seeking organizations has many concerned over the incentives of these agents. 
Previous studies demonstrate that despite utilizing a market based approach, some state housing 
authorities like Texas have been able to successfully create affordable rental units that meet their 
stated priorities. However, some states such as North Carolina have not been as successful. This 
study aims to identify the variation in state housing authorities’ potency in implementing their 
LIHTC programs and creating affordable housing in their states. 
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Introduction 
As social issues become increasingly contested in the public sphere, so too, are potential 
solutions. How to approach dealing with pressing matters such as climate change and health 
inequities, as well as the racial and gendered undertones to all of this, is debated. The type of 
organizations with the decisions and ability to implement potential solutions matter to many. 
This happens in the debate on affordable housing. Advocates have brought up housing vouchers, 
rent control, public housing, and tax credits as ways to help create and preserve housing for low-
income individuals. In this paper, I focus on a popular affordable housing tax credit, the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), and the debates on the effectiveness of this program. I aim 
to suggest potential reasons why this program has so much variation across states.  
Prior work on LIHTC shows that states vary enormously in how effectively they 
implemented LIHTC (Ellen et. al 2015). In this study I compare two states at different ends of 
the effectiveness spectrum, Texas and North Carolina, and determine how different population 
and economic factors may influence the efficacy of LIHTC allocations. Contrary to my original 
hypothesis, the findings suggest that a stronger economy and real estate market helps state 
housing authorities meet their affordable housing priorities.     
 Texas may be more effective in incentivizing LIHTC developments that meet their 
specifications because of a more robust real estate market. This contradicts popular beliefs and 
my original hypothesis that more states and private markets were in tension with one another. 
Instead, the findings suggest more effective states like Texas are able to control and utilize 
private markets to achieve their desired social goals. Additional and more robust research is 
needed to further validate these findings. 
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Context 
  With the advent of urbanization, increasing cost of construction materials, and more 
people in America living alone, housing costs in the US have skyrocketed in a number of places. 
There has been much debate amongst public officials over how to respond to this, especially 
given the history of affordable housing policies. The United States has been grappling with 
providing affordable housing for a number of years, and their initiatives have mixed results. 
Homeowner’s insurance, Housing Vouchers, and Public Housing are some of the more popular 
solutions, though they all have their respective shortfalls.  
 The federal government first started becoming involved in housing in 1934 (Gross 2017). 
The Federal Housing Administration offered potential homeowners insurance on their mortgages 
to encourage homeownership and economic development. This drove suburbanization 
throughout the mid-20th century, but selective lending practices also contributed to the racial 
wealth gap. It also did little to nothing to address the poorest individuals and families, who were 
likely renters. 
 Public housing, the first attempt at an affordable rental program in the US, are owned and 
managed by government bodies. Theoretically, these entities would be able to set rents below 
market rate in order to provide affordable housing for low income individuals since their goal 
was not to maximize profits. Unfortunately, these developments became known for being under-
managed and being community “eyesores” (National Low-Income Housing Coalition 2015). In 
addition, they tended to concentrate the low-income folks into certain neighborhoods, 
perpetuating social stereotypes and not providing opportunities for upward mobility. Eventually 
public housing grew to become a political risk for government officials, since popular opinion of 
these developments was so poor. Supporting public housing was a detriment to politicians’ 
campaigns, and therefore no longer a priority.  
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 Lastly, Section 8 Housing Vouchers act as subsidies for tenants whose income does not 
allow them to afford market rate housing. This allows them to find housing wherever rental units 
are available. Previous studies show that these vouchers increase the financial earnings of 
participating families, demonstrating how these can help increase opportunity for children from 
low-income backgrounds (Chetty et al. 2015). However, this is contingent on families choosing 
to relocate to a neighborhood with higher opportunity. Often participants choose to stay in the 
same neighborhood, and not move away.  
Bipartisan Compromise: LIHTC Overview  
 The demand for housing, combined with tax incentives such as the Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credits (LIHTC), has attracted many for-profit developers to respond to the housing crisis. 
Under the LIHTC program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
allocates a specific number of tax credits to state and local housing authorities every year 
(Usowski, K.G.). Developers apply for these tax credits through Qualified Allocation Plans 
(QAP), which is a detailed breakdown of the projects’ costs and outside financing, building 
information like units and tenants, and other information depending on the authority's priorities 
(e.g. distance from public transportation). All of this is consolidated into a rubric where 
authorities score each proposal before granting the tax credits to the developers, who then sell the 
tax credits in exchange for equity in their housing projects (Qualified Allocation Plan). There is 
an ongoing tenant reporting process in order to ensure that projects that receive allocations are 
providing housing to low income individuals and families (i.e., those that earn less than a certain 
percentage of the AMI, area’s median income). Projects must meet these requirements for 15 or 
30 years, depending on the type of LIHTC used. These programs provide incentives to profit-
seeking individuals for helping in the development and maintenance of affordable housing units, 
in exchange for tax relief. In fact, an average of 1,411 projects were serviced every year from 
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1995 to 2017 (Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, HUD USER). While creating more units is 
certainly a positive from a social welfare point of view, it’s also important to ensure these units 
have equal access to other social services, such as transportation and education.  
  While this is a great example of public-private partnerships and how firms’ pursuing their  
individual best interests can lead to greater societal benefits, there is concern over letting profit 
driven private entities be responsible for affordable housing. In 2015 HUD released a report 
titled Effect of QAP Incentives on the Location of LIHTC Properties that explored how effective 
different states’ QAPs were in affecting the developments of the LIHTC units being built. Using 
the QAPs and allocation data from 21 different states, they determined that changes in the QAPs 
scoring and priorities did have a significant impact on where the LIHTC units were built (Ellen 
et. al 2015). However, this report did not explain 1) understand why some states QAPs were 
more effective than others and 2) if firm behavior changed at all due to the changes in the scoring 
rubric, rather it just explains that the projects that were awarded the credits were affected.  
  This study aims to identify several variables that may explain this variation between 
states’ effectiveness and theorize why they drive variation amongst the states. In particular, I 
focus on Texas and North Carolina, since they were on the extreme ends of the states examined. 
I evaluated economic, population, and political factors that may influence states' LIHTC potency. 
These factors included: 
● Amount of Organizations that Receive LIHTC Allocations 
● States’ Unemployment Rate over 2002 - 2010 
● Average Median Income between 2002 - 2010 
● The % of the population below 30% AMI 
● Average New Residential Permits Issued between 2004 - 2010 
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● Number of Retail Banks (i.e. physical locations) 
● Voter registrations by party affiliation 
  There are, of course, other criticisms of the LIHTC program. For example, LIHTC also 
draws further criticism because of how it determines who qualifies to live in the developments. A 
metric called AMI (Area Median Income) is used as a threshold of who is able to live in 
affordable housing. Those individuals with up to 60% of the AMI are able to live in a LIHTC 
development. This can be problematic since the AMI can be skewed. LIHTC in general seems 
better at providing housing options for moderately poor folks, though not those on the far end of 
the income distribution. In conjunction with other policies such as the Section 8 Housing 
Vouchers, LIHTC developments can serve those populations as well.  
 Another valid question about LIHTC are the expiration dates on affordable housing 
requirements, which expire within either 15 or 30 years. Meaning after this period, LIHTC 
developments are able to be transformed into market rate units and no longer serve low-income 
folks. There have been several studies that look at the transition of previous LIHTC 
developments after these tenant requirements expire, showing that most developments maintain 
affordable for current and future tenants.  
 The entire premise of LIHTC is that it is based on a “market”, with the tax credits acting 
as a subsidy for the development. This is what has made LIHTC so effective at creating new 
affordable housing developments. However this also makes LIHTC vulnerable to downturns in 
said market, specifically the dollar amount of equity able to be obtained with $1 of a LIHTC. 
This amount varies based on the returns of other available investments, the health of the 
economy, and overall federal taxes. During the 2008 recession and after the 2017 TCJA, the 
amount $1 of LIHTC received dropped significantly.  
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The Problem: States have significant variation in the 
potency of their LIHTC programs, possibly ceding decision-
making power to profit motivated organizations 
 
 Some of the most vocal critics of LIHTC have concerns over the reliance on private 
organizations, particularly profit driven ones, in creating affordable housing. Most of these 
concerns arise from political beliefs, such as housing is a human right and democratically elected 
leaders should be the ones responsible for these decisions. There are differences in how state 
housing authorities implement LIHTC and how well the market creates affordable housing that 
meets housing priorities.  
  The effectiveness and perspectives of social enterprises is not an easy thing to measure or 
conclude, though there are countless examples of how profit seeking organizations seeking to 
help address social issues can go awry. Juul, a popular e-cigarette company, states that their 
mission is to “transition the world’s billion adult smokers away from combustible cigarettes, 
eliminate their use, and combat underage usage of our products” (JUUL Mission and Values). 
While their intentions may have been good and have helped at least a few individuals quit 
smoking, they’ve also come under large scrutiny for introducing nicotine to minors. Another 
company, SoFi, helps refinance student loans at a lower rate. They do this by including data 
points on a borrower’s education and major to predict repayment probability. This helps those at 
elite institutions or STEM majors with high earnings potential, though it also perpetuates 
educational inequality by creating another higher class of “assets”. Others criticize private 
organizations for not doing enough, or only engaging in these activities to gain a better 
reputation or dodge tax bills.  
  Though LIHTC is not a tech company like Juul or SoFi, if the proper incentives and 
safeguards are not in place then the incentives could potentially be skewed as well. At least in 
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theory, if a public democratic organization is responsible for these decisions, they can be held 
accountable through future funding or votes in the next election. That same accountability does 
not occur with private organizations like Juul or SoFi, who can produce profits without 
addressing the social issues that they claim to solve. For LIHTC to be effective and beneficial to 
tenants and the community alike, the developers using the credit should be accountable for tenant 
success and unit affordability. This paper observes these factors that affect the control of state 
housing authorities over where LIHTC units are developed and the private LIHTC developers.  
Literature Review 
  There is significant existing literature on affordable housing and the many different 
programs in the US. However, no study evaluates why certain states may be better at 
implementing affordable housing policies, or the LIHTC in particular. The closest study, The 
Role of Private Agents in Affordable Housing Policy (Gaddy and Bastic 2009), focuses on how 
governance structures shape the processes and behaviors of LIHTC developers. Of course, I also 
build upon the work done by the HUD and the Furman Center on how QAP incentives affect the 
location of LIHTC properties. I was also inspired by studies on the effect of LIHTC units on 
property values, conducted at Stanford. However, none of the research analyzes or identifies how 
other factors, such as overall health of the economy, the real estate sector specifically, or how the 
value of $1 of LIHTC can affect the control a state housing authority can have.  
 The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods in Children: New 
Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Project 
  This study built upon the work of the “Moving to Opportunity”, which offered randomly 
selected families housing vouchers to move from high-poverty areas to lower-poverty 
neighborhoods (Chetty et. al 2015). The original study did not find significant correlation 
between those families that moved to lower poverty neighborhoods vs. the control group. Several 
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years after the original study, the team revisited this work, combining the original study’s 
findings with new tax data from the children that were a part of the study’s experiment, data that 
wasn’t available before since the children were not old enough. They found that those families 
that moved to a lower poverty area had higher earnings and were more likely to go to college. 
This however, was only true of children that moved before their teenage years. They 
hypothesized this was due to “disruption effects”, or the children having to readjust and make 
new friends during an already confusing time in their lives. Overall, this study proves the idea 
that where you live or grow up plays a significant role in future life outcomes, which spurred the 
question of how LIHTC developers choose the location of their properties.  
  Who Wants Affordable Housing in their Backyard? 
 Rebecca Diamond and Timothy McQuade provide an analysis of how LIHTC 
developments affect their surrounding neighborhoods (Diamond and Mcquade 2016). Their 
findings indicate that LIHTC is a helpful neighborhood revitalization tool in addition to the 
benefits it brings to the tenants themselves. More specifically, they find that “LIHTC 
development helps revitalize low income neighborhoods, driving up house prices 6.5%, lowering 
crime rates, and attracting a more racially and income diverse population”, though these same 
developments in higher income, low-minority areas lead to the opposite effects. With these 
findings, they estimate that a single affordable housing development helps local homeowners by 
$23,000 and renters by $6,500. This is due to LIHTC developments taking buildings that are 
deemed undesirable and redeveloping them, possibly making the neighborhood more desirable to 
live in and attract other residents. However they also find that after a LIHTC unit is built in a 
wealthier community, property values drop over time due to existing residents moving into other 
neighborhoods, consistent with NIMBY sentiments. This study forced me to think deeper about 
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where affordable housing is built and some of the barriers that may stand in place when building 
them. More specifically, I began to ask “Why not build affordable housing in places with high 
opportunity”, leading me to become interested in NIMBY beliefs, the role of local zoning 
policies, and non-economic barriers that prevents affordable housing in certain neighborhoods. 
  The Role of Private Agents in Affordable Housing Policy 
  With most affordable housing developed by private, for-profit developers, there is 
concern over maintaining the quality of units, especially because of affordable housing’s “broad 
societal importance” (Gaddy and Bastic 2009). This study aims to determine how much control 
governments have over affordable housing programs, specifically in New Jersey and 
Massachusetts. They compared the governance structures and processes in these two states, and 
considered how that might incentivize private agents in their production of affordable housing 
units. They found significant evidence that private agents do respond to policy changes, giving 
the public less reason to be concerned with private enterprises handling public and governmental 
affairs. This article can give me the template to determine if and how private developers respond 
to different policy incentives and navigate their environment. It also gives useful background 
information on why the government began relying on private entities to administer certain 
programs. For affordable housing, this was a lack of political will, lack of integration of housing 
into the neighborhood causing the concentration of poverty into certain areas.  
  The Effect of QAP Incentives on the Location of LIHTC Properties 
  In 2015, researchers from the Furman Center and HUD conducted a study on how states’ 
QAPs affect siting patterns of LIHTC developments using data from 20 states' QAPs (Ellen et. 
Al). Their findings demonstrate that changes in states’ QAPs between 2002 and 2010 did 
significantly affect the developments built in each state during that year. For example, increased 
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priorities in QAPs towards higher opportunity areas led to increases in proportions of LIHTC 
allocations in lower poverty areas. The researchers concluded this by coding changes in each 
states’ QAPs from year to year, marking each change as an integer between -3 and 3, depending 
on if the change should incentivize LIHTC developments in higher poverty areas and the 
theoretical magnitude of the change. However, the findings fail to show “whether developers 
have changed their behavior in response to QAP changes (i.e. whether firms approach QAPs 
with a “point chasing” approach or those projects receiving the allocations simply changed). The 
study also identified certain states’ QAP that were more effective in affecting where future 
LIHTC developments were built, though did not explain why. I hope to address this in my study 
and suggest ways that states can better implement affordable housing programs.  
  Rationale 
  As determined by Chetty, the neighborhood of one’s house plays an important role in 
one’s opportunities (Chetty et. al 2015). However, Diamond and Mcquade show that NIMBY 
sentiments and higher prices can make it difficult for LIHTC developers to build in higher 
opportunity neighborhoods (Diamond and Mcquade 2016). At the same time, LIHTC can be an 
effective way to help revitalize low income neighborhoods, better the community (Diamond and 
Mcquade 2016). This dilemma makes it important for housing authorities and public officials to 
carefully select and influence LIHTC to meet the state's priorities. Unfortunately, this can be a 
difficult task for states to do, considering the variation in housing authorities' success in 
influencing LIHTC locations with their QAPs (Ellen et. Al).  
  This study provides a general overview of the LIHTC program and evaluates its structure 
and potential benefits. This includes a discussion on government expenditures for the program, 
its efficiency, and the type of populations that are affected most. It also outlines some of the 
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impacts that the 2008 financial crisis had on the program and the resulting policy changes in 
response. I draw upon this study to better understand: 1) how LIHTC differs from other 
affordable housing programs and 2) some of the challenges the program faced during the 2008 
recession. Some examples are: a federal trade in of LIHTC for cash and an increase in the 
allocation per state. With this in mind, I hope to be able to understand how economic shifts can 
impact how LIHTC and affordable housing production.   
 Hypotheses  
  My goal is to explain the variation between how effective states housing authorities were 
in determining LIHTC developments’ locations (Figure 1). I hypothesize that a stronger real 
estate market favors private organizations, reducing the potency of state housing authorities. 
Based on the spectrum of states in the Effectiveness of QAP Incentives on the Location of LIHTC 
Properties study, I expected states that performed well (e.g. Texas) to have a strong state housing 
authority that limited the motivations of profit-seeking firms (Ellen et al. 2015). On the other 
hand, I believe states that did not perform well, like North Carolina, to have a real estate market 
that reduced the amount of potency the state housing authority could achieve.  
 
Figure 1 
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  To test this, I made predictions on how the dependent variables (i.e. companies receiving 
allocations, unemployment rate, avg. median income, % population below 30% AMI, avg. new 
residential permits, number of retail banks, and political leanings of voters) would appear as 
characteristics of each state, and possibly influence the role of housing authorities (Figure 2). 
Variable Description Hypothesis 
Companies 
Receiving 
Allocations 
The avg. number of 
organizations that 
receive LIHTC 
allocations in any given 
stat from 2002-2010 
More organizations that receive allocations in any given state would give 
more control to housing authorities. We expect the higher number of 
projects would result in housing authorities to have more options when 
selecting projects to receive allocation, and drive competition amongst 
each other for these allocations. 
Unemploym
ent Rate 
The percentage of 
people without a job 
that are seeking a job in 
any given state 
A lower unemployment rate would increase the control for private 
developers. Unemployment is negatively correlated with the strength of 
the economy, which would increase real estate construction and the 
strength of LIHTC, potentially taking power from housing authorities 
Avg. 
Median 
Income 
The median income in 
that state during the 
2002 - 2010 period 
Higher median income would indicate a stronger economy, and potential 
to collect higher rents to tenants since tenant eligibility is calculated 
using this, therefore giving states more control. 
% Pop. 
below 30% 
AMI 
The proportion of 
people that live below 
30% of the area's 
median income.  
How many people in a given state are able to qualify for LIHTC tenant 
requirements is dependent on the distribution of the incomes in that state. 
A larger number of people below this threshold would motivate housing 
authorities to be more involved. 
Avg. New 
Residential 
Permits  
The raw amount of new 
rental units built in that 
state during the study 
period 
A growing rental housing market may also lead to decreased state 
influence, since the strength of the market would overtake the ability of 
state housing authorities to determine where LIHTC units are placed. 
# of Retail 
Banks 
The total number of 
retail banks in the state 
in 2019 with physical 
locations.  
A higher relative value of $1 of tax credits would give states more 
control in where LIHTC units are built. This is because these tax credits 
are worth more to the project, and therefore organizations' behavior will 
adjust their behavior to earn them. Because the value of these tax credits 
are driven by retail banks due to CRA requirements. 
Political 
Leanings 
Political affiliations and 
beliefs of voters in the 
state. We measure this 
by the percentage 
difference between 
registered Democratic 
and Republican voters.  
A more liberal population would be more inclined to larger forms of 
government and therefore favor government, rather than market, control. 
Figure 2 
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Methodology: Case Study of Texas and North Carolina 
 Based on the previous study done by HUD, Qualified Allocation Plans (QAPs) are 
effective tools for public organizations (i.e. state housing departments) to maintain control over 
the location of LIHTC developments. This study also revealed that some state housing 
authorities’ QAPs are more effective than others, raising the question of why? In other words, 
what external factors present in each state in the study affect how effective QAPs are? Given my 
experience and comfort level, I chose to answer this question through a case study of Texas and 
North Carolina’s state housing departments, or public entities.  
 Texas and North Carolina were identified in the HUD study as two states that were on the 
extremes of effective-ineffective QAPs (Figure 2). This case study is an extension of the 
aforementioned HUD study, and aims to identify what external factors can cause this variation.  
 I am exploring why Texas and North Carolina’s QAP effectiveness differs based on 
different characteristics of the states’ political affiliation, overall economy, real estate industry, 
and several other factors. In short, think of their QAP effectiveness as the “Y” variable, and the 
characteristics and data for each state as the X variables.  
 From the Evaluating QAP Influence on the Location of LIHTC Property study done by 
HUD, the variation in state housing authorities’ LIHTC potency is established. Some states, like 
Texas, demonstrated they were able to significantly affect the location of LIHTC developments, 
others like North Carolina, did not. My original hypothesis was that the tension between private 
and public entities over the location of LIHTC developments would mean a stronger economy 
meant less state influence. This would be problematic, since LIHTC is a market based tool that 
tends to achieve higher outputs of units in strong economic periods. I also believed some states 
chose not to utilize their influence through QAPs, instead opting to pursue other methods of 
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influence or not to exercise their control due to political leanings. My goal was to identify these 
key variables, so states could better exercise control of their LIHTC developments if they chose. 
 Before collecting all of the data used in the case study, I formed hypotheses on how it 
would affect the LIHTC potency of each state. For example, I expected a more liberal population 
to be more comfortable with government programs and decision making. Therefore, I expected 
Texas to have a higher discrepancy between Democratic and Republican voters, measured by 
“StatePoliticalLeanings”, since LIHTC programs in Texas were more potent.  
Limitations 
 Because of the limited nature of a case study and lack of comprehensive data, no 
conclusions or correlations can be drawn. Instead, I pose ideas and theories as to why and how 
different state housing authorities approach LIHTC developments. In addition, this is limited 
because of the number of states in my analysis, and using the HUD Study’s criterion and ratings 
of QAP effectiveness as the guardrails. Some may critique only two states in this study, and 
others would point out that public organizations can exhibit other forms of influence other than 
housing authorities’ QAPs, such as stricter regulations and zoning codes.  
 In addition, I chose to study the selected variables based on its relevance to the LIHTC 
and state housing authorities, as well as the ability to find relevant state level data. For example, I 
wanted to examine the number of new rental units developed in Texas and North Carolina over 
the original study period. This proved to be too difficult, so I used the average new residential 
permits issued from the Census as a substitute. In an ideal world, I could find data on exactly 
how many new rental units are built and the amount occupied in each state in any given year.  
 Moving forward, there is potential for follow up studies to further investigate how states 
may better their LIHTC potency. For example, researchers could recreate the original HUD 
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study and control some of the factors I identified. If North Carolina is underperforming relative 
to Texas potentially because of a weaker rental market, what happens if we isolate and control 
for that variable? Alternatively, a qualitative study with interviews of housing authority 
professionals might be able to uncover the operational or descriptive differences between how 
states approach their LIHTC policies. I hope that this study can lay the groundwork for future 
researchers to investigate how we may better implement affordable housing.  
Results 
 The findings from my research are mixed, with some variables matching the predictions 
made summarized in Figure 2 and others contradicting them. For a complete summary of these 
results, please see Figure 3. The average number of organizations that receive LIHTC allocations 
in each state matched my expectations. Specifically, I assumed a greater number of organizations 
trying to compete and earn LIHTC allocations would provide states with more options in 
selecting which projects best matched their housing priorities. Texas’ has 58.89 organizations 
earning an allocation, compared to North Carolina’s 42.8 (HUD. Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit Database 2019). Because they have 30% more organizations trying to earn allocations, 
Texas has more discretion in selecting the “best” projects, and therefore a higher LIHTC 
potency. 
 I expected Texas to have a higher median income than North Carolina, as a stronger 
economy would drive real estate construction and the ability to collect higher rents (since tenant 
eligibility is calculated using the AMI). This turned out to be true, as Texas and North Carolina 
had average median incomes of $43,647.78 and $40,896, respectively (Duffin 2019). Though it 
supported my hypothesis, the difference was not great enough to cause major variation.  
 As more people qualify for affordable housing under LIHTC requirements, states have a 
larger incentive to prioritize these programs. I evaluated the % of the population that earned less 
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than 30% of the AMI, and found that Texas and North Carolina had similar numbers at 23% and 
22%, respectively (North Carolina & Texas, National Low Income Housing Coalition). Though 
Texas does have a higher number like I expect, it is not a significant difference.  
Organizations receiving LIHTC allocations then sell this to individuals or for-profit 
entities looking to lower their tax bill in exchange for equity and cash in the project. The vast 
majority of these buyers are banks motivated by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). A larger 
number of banks looking for LIHTC projects to invest in would drive up the value of every 
dollar of these allocations, making more projects feasible. Consistent with my expectations, 
Texas had a much larger number of retail banks than North Carolina (420 to 46), possibly 
explaining Texas LIHTC potency (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). 
 Three variables contradicted my original hypotheses: the average unemployment rate, 
average new residential permits, and voter party affiliations.  
● Average unemployment rate: I expected a lower unemployment rate would increase 
control for private developers, and that Texas would have a higher one than North 
Carolina (Duffin 2020). I assumed a stronger economy would cause housing authorities 
to be unable to control LIHTC decisions, though the findings indicate the opposite may 
be true (i.e. the economy helps augment states’ LIHTC potency). 
● New residential permits issued: Similar to the average unemployment rate, I expected 
average new residential permits issued to be a signal of a stronger economy and therefore 
overtake public authorities’ priorities. Between 2004 and 2010, Texas had more than 
double the amount of North Carolina, at 156,501 and 71,297, respectively (Cornish et. al, 
2011). While it contradicts initial expectations, it does indicate that a stronger economy 
would help bolster states’ effectiveness, and not the other way around. 
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● Voter party affiliations: The political beliefs of key elected officials and the constituents 
would likely affect affordable housing programs. I chose to use voters party affiliations to 
determine how comfortable government officials would be with making certain 
decisions. To my surprise, Texas had more registered 3% more Republicans than 
Democrats while North Carolina had 5% less (Gallup 2018). I expected the opposite 
results, given the efficacy of Texas’ LIHTC programs. 
Variables Texas North 
Carolina 
Results 
Companies 
that Receive 
Allocation 
58.89 42.8 Texas scored high on the QAP control rating and has a larger number of 
companies that received a LIHTC allocation, which does reinforce our 
previous idea that more organizations competing for these credits helps the 
housing authorities maintain control. This, however, could be due to the 
higher dollar value of LIHTC allocations given to each state (since that is 
based on population). 
Unemployme
nt Rate 
6.01% 6.74% Texas, with an unemployment rate over a half of a % point lower than 
North Carolina, which contradicts the original hypothesis that the strength 
of the economy (or unemployment rate in particular) would decrease the 
power state housing authorities have over LIHTC placements.  
Avg. Median 
Income (2002 
- 2010) 
43647.78 40896 Texas' average median income is higher than North Carolina's, though not 
significantly. Looking at other indicators of the economy, such as wage 
distribution or total GDP created, might be a better way to determine the 
economy's effect on LIHTC placements. 
% Population 
below 30% 
AMI 
23% 22% Texas and North Carolina have a similar proportion of their population 
below 30% of their respective AMIs, though Texas is slightly higher. This 
supports our claim that state housing authorities have more incentive to be 
involved if there is a greater amount of need for affordable housing. 
Though, the discrepancy between Texas and North Carolina is not great 
enough to reason this is worth investigating.  
Avg.  New 
Residential 
Permits 
Issued (2004 
- 2010) 
156,501.
57 
71,297.71 Over the time period when data was available, Texas had more than 
double the amount of new residential permits issued than North Carolina. 
Lack of comprehensive data prevented us from looking at 2002 and 2003, 
or other real estate indicators, like rental vacancy rates. 
Number of 
Retail Banks 
420 46 Texas has over 9x as many retail banks as North Carolina, meaning there 
is a lot more demand for the LIHTC allocations for each individual 
project. This is consistent with our hypothesis that more retail banks would 
lead to a more robust affordable housing market, and therefore more 
potential for a housing authority to use the market to meet its priorities. 
Even when taking into account population differences, the number of retail 
banks in Texas are significantly greater than North Carolina's. 
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Political 
Leanings 
-3 5 North Carolina has more registered Democrats than Republicans, and a 
greater proportion of Democrats than Texas, which is contradictory to our 
expectation that control was discretionary and exercised to the extent 
politically comfortable. Democrats tend to be more comfortable with 
government involvement in markets, therefore we expected Texas would 
have a higher proportion of Democrats than North Carolina.   
Figure 3 
Discussion 
 The findings indicate that my original hypothesis was wrong, and that stronger economic 
conditions may actually allow state housing authorities to better influence the location of LIHTC 
developments. In other words, public and private entities are not always at odds. Stronger 
LIHTC and real estate markets allow state housing authorities to better meet their priorities. This 
is in line with the theory that “markets are a tool” of sorts, especially in this case where state 
governments are trying to utilize a market to solve an important political problem.  
 Of course, given the lack of available data and format of using a case study, more 
analysis is needed to validate this claim. However, the initial findings indicate that public entities 
are not in a battle with the invisible hand of markets, rather they can use them to reach their own 
priorities. It may also lead one to question how state housing authorities can develop and 
incentivize a stronger real estate market. Though, it is likely that state housing authorities may 
not have control over this many aspects, as it’s difficult to imagine how they might influence the 
number of retail banks in an area or the unemployment rate (Appendix 1). Given the complexity 
and number of parts of even a state economy, it is difficult and may even be impossible for 
public entities to use markets as a tool to achieve humanitarian goals.   
Conclusion 
 In this study, I set out to answer the question of why some states are better at 
implementing their LIHTC programs than others. Because of the importance of housing in 
creating opportunity, I thought it’d be in every states best interest to maximize the potency of 
their programs. I initially expected states to be more effective when the local real estate market 
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was performing less well, as a stronger market would crowd out states’ efforts. My findings, 
however, suggest that states are better able to influence the location of LIHTC developments 
under stronger markets, as they can use the market to incentivize the types of developments that 
meet their needs. This is encouraging, as it suggests private and public enterprises are not always 
at odds. However, some aspects of the economy and local real estate sector are out of a housing 
authority’s immediate realm of control, bringing into question how they might further their goals 
under such constraints.  
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Appendices 
 
Dependent Variables Level of Control or Responsibility of State Housing Authorities 
 
Appendix 1 
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